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Metadata, Surveillance, and the Tudor State1 
We kill people based on metadata.2 
- General Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA. 
 
On 5 June 2013 the Guardian newspaper published an exclusive article, based on 
information leaked to them by Edward Snowden, that revealed a large-scale effort by 
the National Security Agency to collect domestic email and telephone metadata from 
the US telecommunications company Verizon. In the following days it would emerge 
that this was part of a more widespread and systematic program, named Prism, which 
allowed the Agency to gain access from nine Internet companies to a wide range of 
digital information on foreign targets operating outside the United States. The NSA 
defended itself against allegations that its activities contravened the Fourth Amendment 
by arguing the difference between data and metadata: that the contents of the phone 
calls, emails and other communications remained private. Citing a Supreme Court 
ruling from 1979, however, they maintained that Americans had no reasonable 
expectation that the metadata produced by their telephone and Internet 
communications—the names of those making and receiving such communications, the 
time and date of these communications, and the geo-location of each party—should 
remain private.3 Now, in the era of the Trump administration, there is renewed concern. 
																																																								
1 The authors would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council, Stanford Humanities 
Center, and the Royal Society for funding fellowships during which the research for this article was 
undertaken. 
2 David Cole, ‘We kill people based on metadata’, New York Review of Books, 10 May 2014, accessed 10 
November 2017, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/. 
3 This contentious argument, however, was dismantled on 22 June 2018 in the case Carpenter v. United 
States, when by the Supreme Court ruled that the government needs a warrant to access a person’s 
cellphone location history. The court found in a 5 to 4 decision that obtaining such information is a search 




Trump’s appointment to head of the CIA, Mike Pompeo has previously stated that 
'Congress should pass a law re-establishing collection of all metadata, and combining it 
with publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a comprehensive, 
searchable database’.4  
 To a layperson it is perhaps unclear why this should be of concern. How much can 
metadata really reveal? This essay seeks to show that surprisingly deep insights can be 
gleaned from metadata by applying a range of easily available network analysis 
algorithms to a body of metadata collected by another government. The source is the 
State Papers held at the British National Archives, specifically the correspondence held 
in this archive dating from the accession of Henry VIII in 1509 until the death of 
Elizabeth I in 1603. Totalling 132,747 unique letters (duplicates have been excluded), 
an analysis of this archive shows us that we can not only observe broad patterns of 
communication, but also anomalous behaviour, and make predictions about people 
likely to be trading in conspiracies or illicit intelligence. These discoveries demonstrate 
the power of such methods for the study of history. This power, however, is merely a 
shadow of that wielded by government bodies and private companies. The following 
pages also act as a warning, therefore, about the potential uses and abuses of the 
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Nodes: The entities in a network, in this case these are the correspondents. 
Edges: The connections between those entities, which in this case are connections 
marked by letters. 
Degree: The total number of a given node's edges. Here the degree is calculated as the 
total of the in-degree and out-degree.  
In-degree: The total number of people who wrote to a given person.  
Out-degree: The total number of people to whom a given person wrote.   
Betweenness: A measure of a node's infrastructural importance. For any two nodes in a 
network, there is a shortest path between them, and betweenness tells us how many of 
these shortest paths go through a given node. Both communication hubs and 'bridges' 
can have high betweenness.  
Strength: the total number of letters sent and received by a given person. 
In-strength: the total number of letters received by a given person. 
Out-strength: the total number of letters sent by a given person. 
Eigenvector centrality: A measure of a node's proximity to power. As Stephen 
Borgatti puts it: 'even if a node influences just one other node, who subsequently 











The State Papers constitute the working papers of the monarch’s principal secretary 
(equivalent to the modern Secretary of State), comprising heterogeneous materials 
including letters, papers, reports, memoranda, treatises, grants, commissions, state trials, 
treaties and ambassadors’ reports amongst other things. Although the letter constitutes 
just one category of document, for the Tudor period alone we have 132,747 unique 
letters, and many more if we count drafts or copies. Upon entering the hands of the 
monarch's principal secretary, these state papers were regarded as his personal papers, 
meaning that they were often subsequently incorporated into that individual's own 
private archives. For this reason the state papers were scattered across numerous 
locations and collections, and others were lost. Whilst much of the surviving material 
was subsequently requisitioned by the State Papers Office, and later incorporated into 
the Public Record Office (now part of the National Archives), many of the state papers 
still reside elsewhere, most notably within the Lansdowne, Harleian and Cottonian 
collections of the British Library and those at Hatfield House. State Papers Online 
(SPO), an online repository launched by the company Gale in 2009, reunites many of 
these documents in a virtual environment, linking high quality reproductions of the 
manuscripts to their fully text-searchable Calendars (a series of chronologically 
arranged catalogues, begun in 1825), which provide a detailed summary of the 
documents’ contents.6 Most important, SPO provides metadata for each document, 
which in the case of the letters contains valuable relational information akin to that 
collected by the NSA, including: name of sender, name of recipient, date of 
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composition (where given), place of writing (where given), unique document identifiers, 
and a content description.  
 The potential value of this resource is immense, but when Gale launched SPO it 
seems to have assumed scholars would use this data in much the same way that people 
use analogue archives: by browsing through the documents and Calendars (the ‘browse’ 
function), or by calling up specific letters or texts we have already identified (the 
‘search’ function). However, scholars in the humanities are increasingly realising that 
the data that underlies sites like this can be analysed en masse using computational 
approaches. Such approaches have been described variously as ‘distant reading’, 
‘macroanalysis’, and ‘cultural analytics’.7 Regardless of the name, the concept is the 
same: rather than trying to read all the material, we can use available computational 
models to aggregate and analyse this data. The approach of ‘not-reading’ is an attractive 
one when you are working at scale.8 The NSA’s assurances that it was not reading the 
contents of emails were not merely a means to side-step complaints of breaking the 
Fourth Amendment they also spoke to the genuine methodological and statistical 
necessity of working on the scale of billions of communications. Although the 
correspondence within SPO is nowhere near this extensive, a single person attempting 
to read all 132,747 letters at the rate of four letters per hour for eight hours a day during 
the working week would take almost sixteen years (without holidays) to make it all the 
way through, not accounting for very long missives, difficulties of reading illegible 
hands or letters in cipher, and slower reading speeds in foreign languages. And of 
course close reading would just generate more data, which would have to be stored in 
																																																								
7 For an introduction to this terminology, see the books and journals of the same names: Franco Moretti, 
Distant Reading, London, 2013; Matthew Jockers, Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History, 
Urbana, Chicago and Springfield, 2013; and Journal of Cultural Analytics, http://culturalanalytics.org/  
8 Franco Moretti, ‘Conjectures on World Literature,’ New Left Review 1, 2000, pp. 54–68. 
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some way, because it could not effectively be kept in memory. But even if all those 
barriers were surmounted, it would be difficult for an individual to gain a true sense of 
the overarching shape of that archive, the relative significance of its constituent parts, or 
to describe it to a reader. In order to ‘not-read’ this entire archive, however, we needed 
to bypass the interface designed by SPO and get at the underlying XML data. This 
access was granted in 2013.9 Similar kinds of access to pay-walled repositories like 
SPO has been facilitated in the United Kingdom by the ‘text and data mining copyright 
exception’ which enables researchers to make copies of copyright material for 
computational analysis as long as they have a personal or institutional subscription.10  
 Using the XML files, we separated the letters from other kinds of document by 
extracting all records that had an entry in both the 'author' and 'recipient' fields. While 
these metadata fields made the correspondence relationships contained in SPO readily 
available, their contents only became useful for computational analysis after an 
extensive data cleaning process. In particular, the author and recipient fields needed 
thorough disambiguation and de-duplication, for a number of reasons: variant spellings 
of early modern names; letters addressed to a titular office rather than a named 
individual (e.g. the Archbishop of Canterbury); changing office-holders; changing titles 
over a person’s lifetime as they accrued honours and offices; and women’s names 
changing due to marriage.11 Furthermore Tudor families were often unimaginative in 
their naming practices. Just a handful of men’s and women’s names dominated, with 
																																																								
9 XML stands for Extensible Markup Language, a markup language that defines a set of rules for 
encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable 
10 The UK copyright exception and its ramifications for researchers, last modified 9 February 2016, 
https://www.jisc.ac.uk/guides/text-and-data-mining-copyright-exception 
11 While women make up only 4% of the people in the network due to the political nature of the archive, 
this still represents a large number of people when you are working at the scale of 20,656 correspondents. 
Women's letters make their way into the archive though various means, including (but not limited to): 
acting as petitioners to the government; through the seizure of personal and family archives; or because of 




some recurring over several generations of one family. Simply put: single people could 
be referred to by multiple different names; and single names or titles could refer to 
multiple people. The complexity of the sender and recipient metadata fields meant that 
although we initially extracted 37,101 unique name entities, there were in fact only 
20,656 unique correspondents. This cleaning process took eighteen months to complete 
(nine months of which full-time). However, once this process was finished we were able 
to reconstruct the entire Tudor letter network archived in SPO, and subject it to the 
analytical tools developed in the field of network science. 
 Within this field a number of publications anticipate the NSA’s methods by using 
mobile phone data (albeit privacy-safe and anonymized) to uncover the structure and 
dynamics of social networks at different levels, ‘from the small-scale individual’s 
perspective, to the large-scale collective behaviour of the masses’.12 But such methods 
are not restricted to electronic and cellular communication; wherever interactions 
produce or are reducible to metadata, network analysis is possible. In a series of key 
publications in the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars such as Albert-László Barabási, 
Reka Albert, Duncan J. Watts, and Steven Strogatz showed that a huge variety of real-
world networks—for example, neural networks, transport networks, biological 
regulatory networks, and social networks—share an underlying order and follow simple 
laws, and therefore can be analysed using the same mathematical tools and models.13 
They are equally useful to our understanding of Tudor communication. Such methods 
																																																								
12 Julián Candia, Marta C. González, Pu Wang, Timothy Schoenharl, Greg Madey and Albert-László 
Barabási, ‘Uncovering individual and collective human dynamics from mobile phone records,’ J. Phys. 
A: Math. Theor., 41, 2008, p. 224015. 
13 See Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz, ‘Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-world’ Networks,’ Nature, 
393, 1998, pp. 440–42; Albert-László Barabási and Reka Albert, ‘Emergence of Scaling in Random 
Networks,’ Science, 286, 1999, pp. 509–12; Albert and Barabási, ‘Statistical Mechanics of Complex 
Networks,’ Rev Mod Phys, 74, 2002, pp. 47–97; and Mark E. J. Newman, Networks: An Introduction, 




tell us not only about patterns of communications and social structure, but also about 
the history of the archive, its making, and its survival. Historic letter collections are 
subject not only to the vicissitudes of time, but also the bias of collectors. The 
correspondence network found in SPO represents a view of the world from the 
perspective of the successive principal secretaries, compiled from the reports that came 
into their inbox. This view is therefore subject not only to the secretaries' management 
of their contacts, but also to their personal filing habits, and to the subsequent care of 




The Tudor letter network  
Networks are composed of entities, known as 'nodes', and the connections between 
those entities, known as edges. In this letter network we have a system of 20,656 nodes 
(the correspondents) and 37,087 ‘edges’ (communications marked by one or more 
letters). Once the network is reconstructed, a few lines of computer code can inform us 
about its overarching structure.14 One of the simplest things we can measure is a node's 
‘degree’. In this directed network the degree is calculated as the total of the number of 
people who write a to a given person (called the in-degree), plus the total number 
people to whom they wrote (their out-degree). But even this simple measure can 
provide us with a surprisingly helpful overview of the shape of the archive.  
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 If we rank people by their degree from the highest to lowest we see an interesting 
distribution. For Henry VIII’s reign the person with the highest degree is Thomas 
Cromwell (principal secretary to Henry VIII, Lord Privy Seal, and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer) with a degree of 2149, followed by the king (1134), and Cardinal Thomas 
Wolsey his Lord Chancellor (682). Since the archive derives from the papers of the 
principal secretary, it is unsurprising that he should have the highest number of 
correspondents. What is surprising, however, is that of 5785 people in the Henrician 
letter-network only seventeen people (0.3%) have 100 or more correspondence 
connections to other individuals, and only 127 (2.2%) more than 20. By comparison, 
5225 people (90.3%) have five or fewer connections, and 3937 (68.1%) have only one. 
This is a very long tail, which comprises many different kinds of people, from minor 
administrators to petitioners. The latter are represented often by a single letter, usually 
directed to the Principal Secretary, seeking favour or aid of some kind.  
 If we plot the degrees of everyone writing or receiving letters in the reign of 
Henry VIII on a graph (Figure 1a), we can see that they follow what is known as a 
power-law distribution. The distribution of data points within a power-law distribution 
is so broad across several orders of magnitude that it is normally plotted on logarithmic 
axes (in this case increasing in multiples of ten). On these axes a power law distribution 
appears as a straight diagonal line, meaning that whether we look at the network as a 
whole, or just within a specific region, we will always find just a few very well 
connected ‘hubs’ and a very large number of nodes with a relatively small number of 
connections. This power law distribution is a classic feature of real-world networks (the 
same distribution is found in power grids, social networks, and the world-wide web 
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among many other examples).15 But what is striking is that this distribution is almost 
identical for all Tudor reigns: Figure 1b-d chart the distribution of the number of 
correspondence connections (known formally as 'degree distribution') for the reigns of 
Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth I. Even though there are a very different number of 
correspondents in the various reigns because of their different durations and variants in 
survival rate, the proportion of people in the network with a degree of one (that is, who 
corresponded with only one other individual) remains remarkably constant: in Edward 
VI’s reign that proportion is 67.8%, in Mary I’s it is 67.5%, and in Elizabeth’s it is 66%.  
 By direct contrast we can see how single people can dominate the network, 
occupying a large majority of all edges (connections marked by letters). In the reign of 
Henry VIII, of the 10666 edges 2149 connect with Cromwell (20.1%); in Edward's 
reign the Privy Council has 201 of the 1433 edges (14%); in Mary's reign the queen has 
329 of the 906 edges (36.3%); and in Elizabeth's, William Cecil, Lord Burghley 
(Elizabeth I's principal secretary, her Lord Privy Seal, and Lord High Treasurer) has 
4168 of 26813 edges (15.5%). These people are the hubs of our network, both the 
gravitational centre of this epistolary network and the key members of Tudor 
government—the monarchs, principal secretaries, the Privy Council, Treasurers, Lord 
Chancellors, and in Edward’s reign, the Lord Protector—pulling in information and 
intelligence on the one hand, and fielding petitions on the other.  
 This overview is a powerful starting point for analysis. In some ways one might 
be tempted to argue these findings are obvious or just confirm what we already knew: 
that government figures dominate the archive. But that is actually misleading, as 
Matthew Lincoln has persuasively argued that scholars 'are particularly susceptible to 
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confabulating these post-facto rationalizations with the idea that we somehow knew the 
results of this quantitative work already (and, implicitly, that we didn’t need to waste 
our time doing it).' Rather he is keen to stress the difference between what 'in retrospect 
sounds reasonable' from 'what we actually knew before'.16 Before the monumental data-
cleaning task behind this project, it was not possible to compute either their total 
number of correspondents (at the most basic level), let alone the distribution of 
communications between those correspondents. It is highly likely, for example, that 
estimates of the number of people in the archive corresponding with only one person 
would have been wrong by a factor of ten, or more. Grasping the true distribution of 
correspondence is vital if we are to recognise anomalous patterns of correspondence 
within this vast archive, or to detect people who were significant within the 
infrastructure of Tudor communication networks. While we need to grasp quantity to 
get at those significant correspondents to determine who are the statistical outliers, 
thereafter we need to develop custom methods that can tell us about significance beyond 
the obvious measure of 'many'.  
 A good network measurement for examining the organisation of communication 
networks is 'betweenness'. For any two randomly selected nodes in a connected network 
we can find a shortest path between them; betweenness is an algorithm that measures 
how many of these shortest paths pass through a given node or edge. It therefore tells us 
something about the infrastructural significance of a given node within the network as a 
whole, and tends to highlight two kinds of nodes: hubs and bridges. Figure 2 offers two 
'toy' networks (not based on real data) to illustrate why both hubs and bridges benefit 
from this measure. In both cases, the shortest path between any nodes bearing different 
																																																								




letters (e.g. A and B, or B and D) necessarily passes through the bold-outlined nodes, 
because there are no other possible paths. From these diagrams we can also extrapolate 
the reasons why hubs and bridges benefit from the measure of betweenness. Hubs are 
likely to lie on short paths because their large number of connections increases the 
likelihood that a short path will pass through them. Bridges, by comparison, are nodes 
that straddle otherwise disjointed communities, or what Ronald Burt has described as 
‘structural holes’ in the network.17 Both the hub and the bridge are vital in 
communications networks for the effective movement of information. 
 The people with the highest betweenness (or infrastructural significance) in the 
reign of Henry VIII are:  
 
1) Henry VIII, 2) Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, 3) Desiderius Erasmus, 4) Pope Leo 
X, 5) James IV of Scotland, 6) Ferdinand II of Aragon, 7) Richard Pace, 8) 
Francis I of France, 9) Leonardo Loredan, Doge of Venice, 10) Margaret of 
Savoy, 11) William Warham, 12) Privy Council, 13) James V of Scotland, 14) 
Louis XII of France, 15) Margaret Tudor, 16) Cuthbert Tunstall, 17) Silvestro de 
Gigli, 18) Thomas Dacre, Baron Dacre of Gilsland, 19) Thomas Darcy, Baron 
Darcy of Darcy, 20) Katherine of Aragon, 21) John Stewart, Duke of Albany, 22) 
Robert Wingfield, 23) Emperor Maximilian I, 24) Patrick Paniter, 25) Pope Julius 
II, 26) Sir Edward Poynings, 27) Tommaso Spinelli, 28) Sir Richard Wingfield, 
29) Thomas Ruthall, 30) Emperor Charles V.  
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These people fall into four main groups (with some appearing in two): secular rulers 
and popes (numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, 25, 30); leading 
statesmen, secretaries of state, members of the royal household or privy council (2, 12, 
24); religious leaders (2, 11, 16, 17, 29); and diplomats and correspondents at foreign 
outposts (7, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28). The one person who does not fall under these 
headings is Erasmus, who forms his own largely self-contained intellectual community 
within the archive. Focusing on the other twenty-nine people, however, we can see that 
this list is dominated by central governing figures—hubs—and that the exceptions are 
the diplomats. While special ambassadors were often sent in for specific negotiations, 
the role of the resident ambassador was to maintain open channels of two-way 
communication between foreign states and sovereign entities. In both cases, however, 
the aim of the role was to overcome ‘structural holes’: not only geographic distance, but 
also lacunae in information. Diplomats, then, are bridges. 
 The question is: how can we discover more bridges when the hubs dominate the 
top-ranked positions for betweenness? We already know that hubs have a high degree, 
and that, as a result of that high degree, hubs are likely to score highly for betweenness. 
We want to find the people with relatively few correspondents (that is, with low 
degree), who nevertheless score highly for betweenness because such people are likely 
to be bridges. One way to quickly detect such people is by comparing these two 
measures in a graphical representation, as in Figures 3 and 4, and looking for outliers. In 
these two graphs the horizontal axis represents the degree, meaning that the further the 
point is from the intersection of the axes, the higher the degree. The vertical axis, in 
contrast, represents their betweenness ranking (i.e. the ranked place given to a node if 
your order them all from highest betweenness score to lowest). We use the ranking 
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because the betweenness score is expressed as a fractional value, which is more difficult 
to interpret than a rank. In this case a value of ‘1’ on the vertical axis corresponds to the 
individual with the highest betweenness. The data points on the graph are varied in their 
opacity to signal the number of nodes with that score: the darker, the higher the 
concentration of people. The diagonal arrangement of points in the two graphs shows a 
direct correlation between degree and betweenness. In other words, the more 
correspondents a given person has, the more likely they are to have shortest paths going 
through them in this correspondence network. The point is made by looking at the two 
extremes of the graph in Figure 3, which depicts the 5040 correspondents writing in the 
1580s. The left-most and top-most point on the graph represents 3378 people (67%) 
who corresponded with only one person, and have zero shortest paths going through 
them (i.e. a betweenness score of zero). Sir Francis Walsingham can be found at the 
opposite extreme on the graph, the bottom-most and right-most point with a total degree 
of 1579, and with the highest betweenness of any correspondent in this decade. The 
reason for Walsingham’s high number of correspondents is easily understood: he was 
one of Elizabeth I’s principal secretaries (1573-1590), well known for his use of spy 
networks, making him a key information hub during that decade.  
 Between the extremes of Walsingham and the people with no shortest paths going 
through them we have drawn a trend line that shows the general correlation between 
degree and betweenness ranking. The trend line is useful because it enables us to see 
deviations. Those significantly above it are less infrastructurally significant, while those 
below it have a higher bridging function than we might expect from the number of 
people with whom they corresponded. The further away we move from the origin (the 
intersection of the axes), the more the deviation matters because of the logarithmic 
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scale. Focussing on outliers below the trend line, we begin to see an interesting pattern. 
Sir Anthony Standen (A in Figure 3), Thomas Morgan (B), Charles Paget (C), and 
Gilbert Gifford (D) were Catholic exiles and agents working for Mary, Queen of Scots, 
who was famously implicated in a plot against Elizabeth I, which led to her execution. 
Gifford and Standen have also been identified as double-agents in the employ of 
Walsingham. Sir Francis Englefield (E) was another Catholic exile who became a close 
confidant of Cardinal William Allen, leader of the English Catholic exiles, and the 
Jesuit Robert Persons, who advocated forcible intervention by Spain in English affairs, 
and the succession of the infanta. Bernardino de Mendoza (F) was Phillip II of Spain’s 
ambassador in London, but was expelled from England in 1584 after his involvement in 
Francis Throckmorton's plot against Elizabeth I was revealed. What unites these men is 
their Catholic faith, their location in countries outside their own, and their trade in 
intelligence as either conspirators or double agents.  
 This pattern below the trend line is not just a peculiarity of the 1580s: we see it 
again in the graph for the 1590s (see Figure 4). In a similar region of the graph we find 
a cluster of people known for conspiracy and espionage. Thomas Phelippes (A in figure 
4) was a famous cryptographer and intelligence-gatherer who worked closely with 
Walsingham. Other figures include Paget (B), Allen (C) and Persons (D), already 
mentioned above. Thomas Fitzherbert (E) was a member of the Allen party within the 
Catholic exile community, and was in the service of the Duke of Feria, and later became 
Philip II’s English secretary. William Douglas (F), the tenth earl of Angus, and William 
Crichton (G) were both Scottish Catholics involved in the Spanish blanks plot of 1592, 
which sought to further the Counter-reformation in the British Isles. Francis Dacre (H) 
associated with various enemies of the Tudor state: he entered the service of James VI 
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of Scotland, and was a pensioner of Spain, receiving a monthly allowance of 80 crowns 
from Philip II, who made him a captain of musketeers. John Daniel (I) might be 
described as an aspirant-intelligencer, who after a period in exile approached Justice 
Young with reports of a plot to blow up the Tower.18 Other people who have high 
betweenness despite relatively low degree include Catholic exiles who became agents 
for the Tudor government, including John Snowden (J), Christopher Parkins (K), and 
William Sterrell (L). Parkins was a Catholic exile who was subsequently recruited as an 
agent by Walsingham and thereafter employed as a diplomatic agent to Denmark, 
Poland, Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor, and the Hanseatic League. Sterrell is a more 
complex figure with numerous aliases: Stephen Alford has suggested he was a spy 
working under the direction of Phelippes, whereas Patrick H. Martin and John M. Finnis 
have suggested he was in fact a triple agent.19 Snowden is an outlier on this graph, with 
a strikingly high betweenness ranking of 22 (only 21 people have more shortest paths 
going through them during this decade), despite corresponding with only six separate 
people. His case helps us to see why this particular combination of network attributes is 
shared by conspirators and double agents. 
* 
The other Snowden 
Like his namesake Edward, John Snowden might be described as whistleblower. But 
whether this Catholic exile gave up information to the English crown because of a 
personal scruple, or simply to save his life after being captured by the Tudor authorities, 
																																																								
18 Stephen Alford, The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I, London, 2012, pp. 306-8. 
19 See Alford, Watchers, pp. 285-94; Patrick Martin and John Finnis, ‘The Secret Sharers: 'Anthony 
Rivers' and the Appellant Controversy, 1601–2’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 69:2, 2006, pp. 195-238; 
Patrick Martin, Elizabethan Espionage: Plotters and Spies in the Struggle Between Catholicism and the 
Crown, Jefferson NC, 2016. 
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has not been established. What we do know about him, however, suggests that he 
provides a model for understanding the status of Elizabethan double agents. Snowden 
was, in fact, the alias of John Cecil, an English Catholic educated at Trinity College, 
Oxford. Following his graduation in 1583, he attended the English Catholic seminary at 
Rheims, before moving to the English College at Rome, where he was ordained priest 
and spent much of 1587–88 as the Latin secretary to Cardinal Allen. Thereafter he 
travelled to Spain to assist at the seminary of Valladolid, where Father Persons was the 
director. Allen and Persons were two of the most prominent enemies of the Elizabethan 
state: they were at the centre of activities to try and restore Catholicism in England, 
which began with sending missionary priests to England in the 1570s, and continued 
with a tactical alliance with Philip II King of Spain who sought to change the faith of 
England by forcibly removing Elizabeth through plots, such as the Throckmorton plot, 
and the 1588 Armada.20 Under Person’s direction in 1591 Snowden and one John Fixer 
were sent as spies to England, but their ship, the Adulphe, was intercepted and they 
were imprisoned and interrogated by William Cecil, Lord Burghley. As Catholic priests, 
they stood to be tried for treason, but in order to avert this outcome Snowden provided 
Burghley with information on the plans of Persons and Allen, and offered himself as a 
secret agent for the crown.  
 In order to win Burghley’s trust Snowden set down in a letter the principal points 
of the Spanish practices against England, and his own intended services, to show that 
‘hyt is not so impossible as it is comonly taken to be a good subiecte and a good 
																																																								
20 For an overview of their activities, see T.H. Clancy, Papist Pamphleteers: The Allen-Persons Party and 
the Political Thought of the Counter- Reformation in England, 1572-1615 (Loyola University Press, 
1964); F. Edwards, Robert Persons: the biography of an Elizabethan Jesuit, 1546–1610 (1995); Victor 
Houliston, Catholic Resistance in Elizabethan England: Robert Persons's Jesuit Polemic, 1580–1610 




catholique’.⁠21 In this striking statement Snowden claims that it is possible to hold two 
identities in tension: that he could at once be a good subject to his Protestant queen, and 
also practice his Catholic faith. The affirmation of his dedication to two communities 
that were viewed by the Tudor state as mutually exclusive, expresses a metaphorical 
concept of betweenness: he could be a member of both, he claimed, without troubling 
his dedication to either. Such a proposal sounds like opportunism; however, in the same 
letter Snowden suggests that the offer arises from a genuine scruple about the plots 
against his monarch. He claims that he had always been ‘mynded’ to ‘haue geuen 
faythefull information’ to Burghley regarding the plots of the Catholics, once he had 
safely arrived in Amsterdam, and proposing: 
 
to persuade all men [i.e. Catholics] from favouring foraine invasions, from 
practices of treason against her Majestie from exasperatinge the superior 
authoritie or such like violente proceadinges, but to suffer with humility the 
crosse that God doth laye. To make hit evydente to al Catholiques both at home 
and abrode that nether the King of Spayne meaneth them any good by his 
invasions pretendes[,] nor the Cardinal [Allen] or Par[sons, i.e. Persons] have 
eny respecte or remorse of the poor Catholique afflictions at home[.] ⁠22 
 
In this passage he asserts not only his opposition to acts of treason, but also his concerns 
about the motivations of Philip II and the leaders, Allen and Persons. Thereby he both 
reasserts his status as a ‘good subjecte’ and redefines what it means to be a good 
Catholic: he must not raise arms, but rather suffer his ‘crosse’. Based on this 
																																																								
21 Snowden to Burghley, 23 May 1591 SP 12/238 f.257r. 
22 SP 12/238 f.257r-v. 
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reassessment, Snowden proposes that by granting religious freedom Burghley could win 
over current opponents to the English cause. In exchange for liberty of conscience, he 
suggests, exiled Catholics like he would readily take an oath neither to hear nor suffer 
any practice of treason, or deal in matters of State. 
 Snowden’s proposal was audacious. As Stephen Alford points out, such a claim 
‘went against the grain of over thirty years of Elizabethan thinking. Burghley had long 
viewed all the English priests trained in the seminaries of France, Italy, and Spain as 
conspirators and traitors’.23 But Burghley clearly took it seriously. After recovering 
Snowden’s papers from the Adulphe, which confirmed many of his claims, he and his 
companion were recruited as double agents on 3 May 1591. To effectively undertake 
this mission Snowden was required to seem like a loyal member of the Catholic exile 
community whilst gathering intelligence for the English crown. The act of 
communicating with such resolutely opposed communities is what gives Snowden, and 
others like him, such high betweenness. Despite corresponding with relatively few 
people, the record of his correspondence in the State Papers archive places him between 
key leaders in these respective communities, as can be seen in Figure 5. In fact, this 
diagram shows just how similar Snowden's community looks to the toy example of the 
'bridge' in figure two.  
 Snowden had a clear idea of how information should flow between these two 
communities, making him not only a bridge but also a gatekeeper of information.24 In 
one direction, towards the Tudor government, he sent details of Spain’s military 
capabilities, names of Allen's principal agents in Rouen, Paris, Madrid and Flanders, a 
																																																								
23 Alford, Watchers, 276. 
24 A formal definition of a 'gatekeeper' within social network analysis is given in Roger V. Gould and 
Roberto M. Fernandez, 'Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Brokerage in Transaction 
Networks', Sociological Methodology 19 (1989), 89-126. 
 
	 20	
long list of priests who opposed Allen's aggressive policy, and Elizabethan subjects who 
favoured the Spanish. In the other direction Snowden promised to send information to 
exiled Catholics about the situation of English Catholics, challenging the perception 
amongst that community that in England there is 'practysed vppon Catholics a most 
rigorous persecution' such that 'the oulde prisons wyll not houlde them but new ar 
buylded[; and] that the tormentes they suffer ar infinite and the maner of theyre deathes 
intollerable'. He proposed to inform them that, instead, he found there 'greate peace, 
tollerance, tranquillitye, and moderation with wonderfull clemency and mercy, and 
almost a general libertye and dimission of all'.⁠25 What is interesting about this passage is 
that Snowden does not suggest circulating misinformation within the exile community, 
as we might expect within a programme of espionage; rather, he states the power of 
truth. This may simply be to appease his conscience. But this approach powerfully 
communicates the betweenness both of Snowden’s identity and has strategy: he can at 
once correct the misapprehensions of his fellow believers, and also arouse doubt and 
dissent amongst the treasonous opponents of the Tudor state.  
 By what means he spread this information (if indeed he did) remains unclear as 
no letters that survive in the State Papers archive that were sent to Catholics contain 
such sentiments. It is more likely, however, that he transmitted it through other means. 
Snowden had a clear understanding of the best way of moving information between 
countries and discrete communities: by circuitous, and thus less traceable, routes. In his 
early letters to Cecil he proposes the safest paths of information across the network. In a 
letter dated 3 July 1591 he suggests the ‘most compendious and comodious’ way of 
informing the King of Spain of ‘the false fundations and vayne hopes’ he receives of the 
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state of things in England is ‘by the Duke of Savoye, and he have hyt from Morgan and 
those he favoreth in Flaunders, and they wyll easely be brought to performe any suche 
office’.26 In another letter on 7 July he proposes similar routes to get information to the 
Pope's Nuncio in Madrid (via the Bishop of Cassiano and ‘D. Luys’), to the Duchess of 
Feria (via Lord Hungerford), and, by her son, to Philip II.⁠27 This strategy shows how 
Snowden’s value to Burghley and Cecil derived not only from his access to intelligence 
within the exile community, but also of his masterful understanding of how intelligence 
should be moved. In these examples we can see that although Snowden provides the 
most direct path across the network (the source of his high betweenness), he understood 
that a longer, meandering path provided him with a valuable form of protection.   
 Snowden's full story is a fascinating one, which, unfortunately, there is not space 
here to tell. Nevertheless, this brief overview of his activities, and his description of 
how he proposed to manage his contacts, is enough to show the kind of network 
significance that Snowden wielded: he was able to make short paths across the network, 
to channel news between communities, but to keep those communities successfully 
separate. These are the attributes that made Snowden such an effective double agent, 
and they are attributes that can be measured: they result in low degree and a very high 
betweenness. In other words, this is the network profile of someone trading in 
intelligence, and it is why we find him in figure 4 in the company of so many others 
involved in conspiracy, espionage, and counter-espionage. 
 
* 
The power of prediction 
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If there is a network profile for those who traded in secret information, then a predictive 
model can be developed. We constructed such a predictive approach by creating a 
network 'fingerprint' for each correspondent in the dataset using eight network 
measures, to see if those with the most similar network attributes amongst the 20,656 
people in the archive might also have been involved in conspiracy or espionage. This 
approach has clear parallels with the NSA’s use of metadata analysis to identify citizens 
or foreign targets that might merit closer scrutiny in the form of wire-taps and other 
systematic surveillance.  
 We chose to use eight network measures because a larger range of measurements 
gives us a higher-dimensional space, which in turn allows us to distinguish a greater 
variety of potential network roles. For each correspondent we measured their in-degree 
(total number of people writing to a given individual), out-degree (total number of 
people to whom a given individual wrote), degree (the total of the previous two 
measures), in-strength (an individual’s total incoming letters), out-strength (an 
individual’s total outgoing letters), strength (the total of the previous two measures), 
betweenness and eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality in this context might be 
described crudely as a measure of a given node's (i.e. person's) proximity to power. As 
Stephen Borgatti puts it: 'even if a node influences just one other node, who 
subsequently influences many other nodes ... then the first node in that chain is highly 
influential'.28 Hubs score highly for eigenvector centrality, but so do nodes with few 
connections that are 'well placed'. Because of the nature of this archive, which is 
constructed from the perspective of the principal secretary, an edge shared with a 
monarch or principal secretary will ensure a high eigenvector centrality score. We can 
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therefore see eigenvector centrality as a rough indicator of distance from central 
government. Taken together, these eight measurements provide a unique fingerprint for 
every person in the network. It is then possible, beginning with one person of interest, to 
find individuals with similar values for those measures by calculating a mathematically-
derived similarity score, and ranking individuals according to it (from most similar, to 
least).29  
 This predictive approach was tested with the spies and conspirators that appear in 
figures 3 and 4 and was found to be remarkably successful in finding other people with 
a similar role in the network within the top fifteen to twenty search results. For example, 
the fifteen people most similar to Cardinal Allen writing in the Elizabethan reign are (in 
rank order):  
 
1) William Douglas, Earl of Angus, 2) Robert Persons, 3) Anthonio de Guarás, 
4) Sir Gelli Meyrick, 5) Francis Dacre, 6) Anthony Babington, 7) Juan de 
Idiáquez, 8) Mathew Carnsew, 9) Pedro de Zubiaur, 10) Hugh Owen, 11) 
Thomas Paget, Lord Paget, 12) Sir William Catesby, 13) Gilbert Curll, 14) 
Charles of Lorraine, Duke of Mayenne, 15) Francesco de Mendoza. 
 
We have already encountered Douglas, Parsons, and Dacre. Guarás was a Spanish agent 
accused by the English spy William Herle of exchanging intelligence with rebels, 
Catholics and other discontented parties.30 Meyrick was a Welsh conspirator in Essex's 
rebellion, and executed for his part in it. An English Catholic, Babington gave his name 
																																																								
29 Such a score can be calculated in several ways. Our approach was to use the Euclidean distance 
between the eight-dimensional points defined by the logarithms of an individual’s ranks for the different 
measurements. 
30 Rory Rapple, Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 
1558-1594, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 102-4. 
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to a plot against Elizabeth, for which he was executed. Idiáquez was one of Philip II’s 
chief advisors, and oversaw English and Irish affairs. Zubiaur was a soldier who won 
several victories over the English for Philip II. Owen and Paget (Charles’s brother) were 
Catholic exiles involved in various conspiracies against the throne. Catesby was a Jesuit 
who was arrested for having harboured the Catholic martyr Edmund Campion. Curll 
was Mary Queen of Scot’s secretary and undoubtedly complicit in her secret 
correspondence with the key conspirators who plotted to place her on the throne. 
Mayenne was Leader of the Catholic Alliance in Europe. And Mendoza, after serving 
Phillip II, entered the diplomatic and military service of Archduke Albert of Austria, 
governor of the Spanish Netherlands.  These men, then, fall into two main categories: 
eight of them are Catholic conspirators from the British Isles, and five of them are 
continental Catholics, four of which are Spanish men in figures of diplomatic and 
military leadership. What unites them is that all thirteen were perceived to present 
foreign threats to England’s security, and the majority of their correspondence entered 
the archive through interception. Meyrick might also be loosely grouped with them as a 
conspirator. Only Carnsew fails to conform to this pattern. Out of the highest fifteen 
matches, then, the similarity score succeeded in fourteen cases (93%).  
  With other conspirators the similarity score does almost as well. For Persons, 
eleven out of the top fifteen are fellow conspirators if we examine the whole 
Elizabethan period (73%). The profile of Sterrell returns results for ten conspirators and 
foreign leaders who plotted at different times with the Spanish among the top fifteen 
(67%). For others this method becomes more accurate if we limit the time window to a 
decade: Englefield and Morgan results include six conspirators of the top ten in the 
1580s (60%); and Crichton's include seven spies or conspirators out of ten in the 1590s 
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(70%). The low score for eigenvector centrality—a measure that, as discussed above, 
we can use to think about proximity to, or distance from, central government—is a 
distinctive aspect of this network fingerprint. Government interception essentially 
brings into the network communication lines that might otherwise be separate from 
official government intelligence networks. Inclusion of these letters might boost the 
degree of individuals by adding data, and it may uncover connections between sub-
communities in the network that might otherwise have been hidden. However, the 
centres of those communities are still, necessarily, separated from the crown, thus 
keeping the eigenvector centrality score idiosyncratically low. 
 The similarity score does not only find patterns of conspiracy and interception, 
however. Its use is more general, helping us to understand the commonalities in network 
properties within and between particular groups of people. In this way we can, for 
example, find clusters of people sharing particular correspondence behaviours that 
correlate with certain activities. For example, if we look at Tommaso Spinelli—one of 
England’s earliest resident ambassadors, serving at the court of Margaret of Austria—
the twenty most similar individuals seem at first to be heterogeneous in their official 
roles: statesmen, diplomats, churchmen. On closer scrutiny, however, we discover that 
all bar one of them served on diplomatic missions during in the reign of Henry VIII 
(95%).31 Similarly, we can use the method to highlight new categories of people that 
lack a clear label. One example of this can be seen with the people most similar to 
Pietro Bizzarri, a fascinating figure who came to our attention in the first instance 
because of his unusual network profile: despite a very high number of outgoing letters 
																																																								
31 On Spinelli see, Betty Behrens, ‘The Office of the English Resident Ambassador: Its Evolution as 
Illustrated by the Career of Sir Thomas Spinelly, 1509-22’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
16, 1933, pp. 161-195 (p. 162). 
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(in the top 0.58%) he has zero eigenvector centrality, because he only receives letters 
from one individual who does not write to anyone else. The significance of the 
similarity list he produces is best understood, however, with a brief overview of his 
biography.  
 Bizzarri was Italian convert to Protestantism who first came to England as a 
fellow of St John’s College at Cambridge, and subsequently sought a career as courtier-
poet in the courts of Edward VI, Mary Stuart, and Elizabeth I, before requesting 
permission from Burghley in 1564 to travel to Venice with the continuation of his 
pension. 32 Bizzarri makes a compelling case for the continuation of his payment: ‘Et 
auidem existimo nullum esse in europa locum qui sit magis aptus et opportunus rebus 
cognoscendis, quam uero istud omnibus Principibus ac Regibus perutile sit, quotidiana 
experientia testatur’ (because I think there is no place better or more apt in Europe to 
gain knowledge of affairs that are beneficial to kings and prices, as everyday experience 
shows us).33 In return for permission to travel, then, Bizzarri offered himself as an 
'intelligencer' (an early modern term used to used to describe people who furnished 
information on an ad hoc basis, or people we might now categorise as spies). It was an 
offer Burghley readily accepted, having no diplomatic presence in Venice at that time, 
and so began Bizzarri’s lifelong career as an intelligencer, passing political and 
diplomatic information to the Tudor government.  
 We find the fifteen most similar people to Bizzarri in the Elizabethan period are:  
 
																																																								
32 On Bizzarri, see Kenneth R. Bartlett, ‘Bizzarri , Pietro (b. 1525, d. in or after 1586)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2487, accessed 17 Sept 2016]; and Massimo Firpo, Pietro 
Bizzarri, esule italiano del cinquecento (Giappichelli, 1971). 
33 SP 15/12 f.23r. 
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1) Edmund Palmer, 2) Thomas Stokes, 3) Roger Aston, 4) William Stallenge, 5) 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges, 6) Sir William Browne, 7) Georges Fremyn, 8) Thomas 
Copley, 9) William Lyly, 10) Captain Cockburn, 11) Sir Dennis O’Roughan, 12) 
John Lee, 13) Sir Edmund Uvedale, 14) Edward Burnham, 15) Edward 
Grimeston. 
 
From this list emerge two small groups: military leaders (6, 7, 10, 13), and men in the 
service of diplomats (3, 9, 14, 15); beyond that, the list appears heterogeneous, 
including agents, priests, and merchants. As we look carefully at their letters, however, 
it emerges that all bar one (Copley) of these fifteen men are involved in reporting to the 
government. Palmer, described in the Calendar of State Papers as a priest, was a double 
agent located mainly in Saint-Jean-de-Luz and sent intelligence reports to Walsingham 
(nine letters), Burghley (eighteen) and his son Robert Cecil (twenty-four) on the 
Spanish. Stokes was an English merchant at Bruges who sent 111 letters to Walsingham 
on military developments in the Low Countries. Stallenge was a merchant involved 
with the new Plymouth haven, where he collected intelligence from incoming ships 
from Brittany, Spain and Portugal, and sent it, in 188 dispatches, to Robert Cecil. 
O’Roughan was a double-agent Catholic priest, first used by the Lord Deputy of Ireland 
Sir John Perrott as a priest-catcher, and then subsequently by Perrott’s successor, Sir 
William Fitzwilliam, to accuse Perrott of being crypto-papist Spanish spy, on which 
topic he wrote thirty-six letters to Burghley and three to Elizabeth I. And Lee was an 
agent in Antwerp, posted there perhaps first in a military capacity, who sent reports to 
Burghley (thirty-eight letters) and his son Cecil (twelve) on the activities of the English 
exiles. Taken together we see a shared profile: like the spies and conspirators they have 
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low degree measures and low eigenvector centrality; but unlike them they have high 
strength, especially out-strength (total number of letters sent) due to the high volume of 
intelligence they sent to the queen’s principal secretary. 
 What is also notable about this list of fourteen intelligencers is that only five of 
them have any kind of biographical record, either in the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, The History of Parliament or even Wikipedia: Aston, Stallenge, Gorges, 
Lee and Uvedale. Lacking biographical entries does not, of course, mean that figures 
are unknown to historians, but in addition these men are almost absent from scholarship 
apart from the occasional passing reference (normally following the formulation: ‘X 
sent a letter to Walsingham/Burghley/Cecil with the information that….’).34 The focus 
is on the events reported by these men, rather than on the men themselves and their 
intelligence roles. However, while individually these men may not be deemed worthy of 
their own histories, we would contend that considered as a group they are. By using the 
similarity score we are encouraged to understand the commonalities between those men, 
and how they constitute a category of extra-diplomatic intelligencers.  
 A call to write a collective history of this extra-diplomatic category, if answered, 
would allow us to extend, and problematise, the existing scholarship on early modern 
diplomacy.35 Figures sent on official embassy could only offer so much intelligence-
coverage: they had a set geographic posting, and certain social networks remained close 
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to them as formal representatives of a foreign power. As a result scholars including 
William Sherman, Lisa Jardine, Stephen Alford, and Elizabeth Williamson have 
gestured to the ways in which secretaries of state sought to diversify the sources of their 
information—from educational travellers (or 'scholarly readers'), to merchants, 
turncoats and opportunists—and the problems this has created for labelling the men 
who served the intelligence-arm of the government.36 Alford writes: 'there was no kind 
of distinction between the gathering of intelligence at home or abroad or between 
intelligence, security work and counter-espionage. The secret reports on Walsingham’s 
desk in the 1580s could range from letters by diplomats to the reports of informants 
working close to English Catholic families’ ⁠.37 By using similarity measures, however, 
we can begin to quantify the differences between those diplomats and informants, and 
where our category of the extra-diplomatic intelligencer fits into that taxonomy.  
* 
Surveillance of Surveillance 
The discussion of taxonomies however, brings us to a more general, and perhaps more 
important point: that we might need to think more broadly about what it means for two 
people to be similar. Our tendency is to want to create bounded categories with labels, 
and ontologies, and to think about similarity in terms of those. This, however, can be 
counter-productive when thinking about people. Individuals can hold multiple official 
or unofficial roles in the network through time or simultaneously; the definition of roles 
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may change through time and not even be consistent at any one time; and roles may 
overlap. Rather, we want to suggest that by thinking about similarity in terms of 
network properties rather than human-assigned categories we can begin to understand 
group identities in different ways, including the shadings and slippage between those 
categories, thereby destabilising them in productive ways.  
 One way of thinking about this slippage is to focus on the people who do not seem 
to fit the general pattern of people with whom they co-appear, either on the graphs 
charting betweenness against degree, or using the similarity measure. If we look back at 
figures 3 and 4 we see that amongst the spies and conspirators that cluster below the 
trend line are scattered a number of foreign leaders. In Figure 3, which depicts the 
correspondents writing in the 1580s we see that appearing close to the Catholic 
conspirator Englefield are Ottavio Farnese, Duke of Parma (I), and Rudolph II, Holy 
Roman Emperor (J). We see other foreign leaders in the bottom right-hand of the graph, 
closer to the horizontal axis because of their high betweenness, including: James VI of 
Scotland (K), Henry III (L) of France, and Mary Queen of Scots (M). All of these 
figures are implicated in the State Papers archive because they wrote directly to 
Elizabeth and/or her principal secretaries; but they also sent a considerable body of 
correspondence to other contacts that are not within the natural ambit of the Tudor 
government. Rudolph II, for instance wrote to a wide range of continental monarchs, 
members of the nobility, and archbishops. The most likely reason we have these is 
because they were intercepted. For example, the 1580 letter from Rudolph to Edzard II, 
Count of East Fresia, concerning trade agreements with the English, and the desire of 
the Merchant Adventurers to resettle in Emden, appears in the archive in an English 
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translation annotated by Christopher Hoddesdon.38 Hoddeston was master of the 
Merchant Adventurers at Hamburg, and sent regular political intelligence from Emden 
and Antwerp to Walsingham and Burghley.  
 The other foreign leaders were subject to the same scrutiny and practices of 
interception. It is this fact that places them alongside conspirators and spies. Foreign 
leaders are, of course, in no sense similar to Catholic conspirators in terms of standard 
labels or ontologies we might apply to them. They look similar on a graph comparing 
degree and betweenness centrality because of two factors. The first is their international 
reach: conspirators and foreign leaders both correspond with people at a geographical 
remove, and with whom the government may have no direct epistolary access. The 
second factor is not one of their own making; rather, the seizure of letters—whether by 
the covert and targeted interception of particular letters, or the wholesale requisitioning 
of a personal archive—leaves behind a particular signal in the archive. Our use of 
betweenness to understand the resulting infrastructure of the archive shows that the 
surveilled individuals provide short paths to the regions of the network extended by the 
interception and seizure of correspondence. It allows us to see that the structural 
similarity that we see is only partly about the epistolary practices and social position of 
individuals; it is also about the making of the archive and how the process by which it 
comes to us in the present, with all its complex motivations and biases, necessarily 
shapes the evidence as we receive it.   
 As a result, the findings of our predictive methods not only show us something 
about the network fingerprint of individuals and the people most similar to them; in 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, it shows the fingerprint left behind by 
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government surveillance, and tells us precisely who was being targeted in any given 
period. If we compare betweenness and degree for each of the decades preceding 1580 
(going back to Henry VIII's accession) we see a different pattern from the one observed 
in Figures 3 and 4. While the deviations below the trend line consistently contain 
foreign leaders across all decades (showing that they remain a perennial target of 
surveillance), we only begin seeing Catholic conspirators in this region of the graphs 
from the 1570s onwards. Following the Ridolfi plot, and Rising of the North, both in 
1569, and the secret arrival of Catholic priests in England in the 1570s, panic about a 
co-ordinated Catholic conspiracy between Philip II and Mary Queen of Scots increased 
exponentially. Figures 3 and 4, then, act as a barometer not only of foreign threats but 
also of the government's fears. 
 By using the data-driven methods similar to those employed by modern 
governments and agencies, we are able to understand something about the surveillance 
practices of historical governments. As such it might be called surveillance of 
surveillance. This approach helps us to look deeper into the historical archive. The cases 
outlined above illustrate how quantitative methods can help scholars to navigate 
massive archives by suggesting areas that may merit close reading. This is the ultimate 
aim of our methods. A variety of simple and more advanced network analysis measures 
allows us to observe broad trends, such as the scale-free distribution of correspondents; 
to examine the way in which particular individuals bridged disparate communities; and 
to construct a similarity measure that helps us to detect structural similarities between 
people in the network. More generally the methods we describe enable researchers to 
both make discoveries about individual histories, and examine their role in the broader 
narrative of Elizabethan foreign and domestic policy. 
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 But aside from the application of these methods to historical scholarship, these 
findings also lead us to think about what we can infer about the methods of government 
agencies and private companies undertaking network analysis on citizens. Their 
methods undoubtedly go far beyond ours, resourced as they are with greater funding, 
labour, computational expertise, and data. Nevertheless, we can easily imagine how the 
‘distant reading’ methods demonstrated above provide ways of profiling citizens and 
foreign targets in order to predict likely security threats. The data will undoubtedly 
show similar patterns of scale-free degree distributions, and members of known terrorist 
groups will serve as reference data to help build predictive models similar to our own. 
The results of such predictions, however, have different repercussions: the decision to 
read a historical letter has few if any ethical ramifications, whereas the act of 
surveillance necessarily compromises the privacy of the target. The justification for this, 
however, is one of national security.  
 The promise that such methods might help to avert future terrorist attacks means 
that many people have come to accept that some level of surveillance is necessary for 
our safety: we are comforted by the assertion that if we are good citizens we have 
nothing to fear. It may be these reasons that the introduction of the Investigatory Powers 
Bill (known as the Snooper's Charter Bill) in the UK in 2016 was passed with little 
resistance.39 These arguments, however, make the assumption that governments will act 
on such intelligence only when a threat is posed. But even with the best intentions 
political organisations and private companies cannot ignore the slippery slope between a 
careful overseeing eye and the use of surveillance as a tool of manipulation or 
dictatorship. In 2018 the whistle-blower Christopher Wylie revealed that data harvested 
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from the social networking site Facebook was utilized by political campaigns to 
understand the social profiles of citizens not simply for the purposes of close-reading, 
but its active counterpart, micro-targeting: the generation of individualised political 
messages designed to serve a particular agenda. This is merely a confirmation of the 
warning issued by Alex Younger, the head of MI6 in the UK, in 2016 that ‘the 
connectivity that is the heart of globalisation can be exploited by states with hostile 
intent to further their aims. […] The risks at stake are profound and represent a 
fundamental threat to our sovereignty’.40 It is now abundantly clear that the gathering, 
analysis, and manipulation of network data are as much a challenge to national security 
as they are an aid.  
 The subsequent attempts to place checks on these activities—such as the Supreme 
Court case Carpenter v. United States, or the inquiry into what Facebook knew about 
Cambridge Analytica's activities—show the growing realisation that we need to place 
the surveillance (or dataveillance)41 practices of governments and companies 
themselves under surveillance. However, the onus should not just be left to the political 
and judicial institutions. The scholarly community has a duty to think deeply about the 
ethics and practicalities of data gathering, and the question of 'where digital security 
ends and national security begins'. 42 This is already happening in computer science and 
the digital humanities, but historians have an important voice to add. The history of 
surveillance offers vital lessons for the current moment. But it is important that we also 
																																																								
40 Quoted in Commissioner Julian King's Speech to the National Cybersecurity Centre, In London in 
2017. Full text available here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/king/announcements/commissioner-kings-speech-national-cybersecurity-centre-london_en  
41 José van Dijck, 'Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm  
and ideology', Surveillance & Society12 (2014, 197-208. 






look to the future. The more we engage with the power that big data and digital methods 
hold for us, the more we can help to shape the development of theoretical discourse 
around metadata and surveillance in ways that make sense for the humanities, and for 




Figures 1a-d: These four graphs chart the distribution of the number of correspondence connections 






Figure 2: Two 'toy' networks illustrating why both hubs and bridges benefit from the measure of 
betweenness. In both cases, the shortest path between any nodes bearing different letters (e.g. A and 
B, or B and D) necessarily passes through the red nodes, because there are no other possible paths. 
  
  
Figure 3: This graph charts degree against the betweenness ranking of each person who corresponded 
in the 1580s. The data points on the graph are varied in their opacity to signal the number of nodes 
with that score: the darker, the higher the concentration of people. 
  
 
Figure 4: This graph charts degree against the betweenness ranking of each person who corresponded 
in the 1590s.s 
 
